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THE EXTENSION OF THE BRUTON RULE AT THE
EXPENSE OF JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY IN GRAY V.
MARYLAND
I. INTRODUCTION
"An argument broke out between [Kevin] and Stacey in the
500 block of Louden Avenue. Stacey got smacked and then ran
into Wildwood Parkway. Me, [Kevin], and a few other guys ran
after Stacey .... We beat Stacey up."'
The preceding quotation is an excerpt from the confession
Anthony Bell gave to the Baltimore City Police in 1993. Both
Bell and Kevin Gray were tried jointly for the murder of Stacey
Williams, who died as a result of the beating.2 At trial, the
police officer who read the confession into evidence, over the
objection of Gray's counsel, said the word "deleted" wherever
Gray's name appeared.3 The jury was left to infer from the
confession to whom the term "deleted" referred. Subsequently,
the jury convicted both Bell and Gray of involuntary man-
slaughter.4 Gray appealed his conviction, asserting that the
introduction of Bell's confession at the joint trial was unconsti-
tutional.'
1. Gray v. Maryland, 118 S. Ct. 1151, 1158 (1998).
2. See id. at 1153.
3. See id.
4. See Gray v. Maryland, 667 A.2d 983, 984 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
5. See id. at 985 (posing the question of "whether the introduction of a nontesti-
lying codefendant's inculpatory statement ... violates a defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment .... ").
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The use of joint trials in American criminal procedure is
widespread due to their efficiency and consistency.' A problem
develops, however, when one co-defendant has confessed and
the others have not. In many instances, that confession incul-
pates the other co-defendants. These co-defendants are unable
to cross-examine the confessor or to challenge the veracity of
the confession due to the confessor's right against self-incrimi-
nation.7 This denies the non-confessing defendants their con-
frontation rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.' As a
result, the confession is inadmissible as evidence against non-
confessing co-defendants. The confession may only be used
against the confessor, and the presiding judge must instruct the
jury to that effect.9
In Bruton v. United States, ° however, the Supreme Court
ruled that in some instances the admission of a confession at
trial may constitute reversible error, despite any limiting in-
structions to the jury.11 The admission of the confession may
have such a prejudicial effect upon the jury, with regard to the
non-confessing co-defendants' cases, that a limiting instruction
would have little effect. 2 In Gray v. Maryland," the Court
considered whether an edited confession, which removed the
names of the co-defendants and inserted symbols or signs of
deletion, had a similarly prejudicial effect.'4 The Court ruled
that such deletions had substantially the same impact upon a
jury and that those confessions should not be allowed in a joint
trial.15
6. See Judith L. Ritter, The X Files: Joint Trials, Redacted Confessions and
Thirty Years of Sidestepping Bruton, 42 VILL. L. REV. 855, 919 (1997) (citing Justice
Scalia's opinion in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209-10 (1987)).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself. . . ."); see also Alfredo Garcia, The Winding
Path of Bruton v. United States: A Case of Doctrinal Inconsistency, 26 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 401, 403 (1988).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with witnesses against him . . ").
9. See Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
10. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
11. See id. at 137.
12. See id. at 129.
13. 118 S. Ct. 1151 (1998).
14. See id. at 1153.
15. See id. at 1155, 1157 (holding that such deletions fall "within the class or
statements to which Bruton's protections apply").
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This casenote traces the history, meaning, and future ramifi-
cations of Gray v. Maryland. Part I examines the precedential
course that the Supreme Court has taken with co-defendant
confession cases. Part II scrutinizes the procedural and substan-
tive history of Gray v. Maryland, following its course from the
Maryland Circuit Court to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Part III analyzes the consistency of the Gray decision
with prior precedent, especially in terms of placing expectations
upon juries and public policy efficiency concerns. Finally, Part
IV addresses the options which the Gray decision leaves open to
lower courts and prosecutors in trying co-defendant confession
cases.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND INTERPRETATION
OF THE BRUTON RULE
The Supreme Court has taken a meandering route in its
interpretation and application of the Sixth Amendment Confron-
tation Clause to co-defendant confessions in joint trials. In Delli
Paoli v. United States,6 the Court first tackled the subject of
prejudicial confessions at joint trials. The case involved the
introduction of impermissible hearsay against a defendant in
the form of a confession made by a co-defendant, which impli-
cated the defendant.' Because the defendant could not cross-
examine the confessor, due to the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, 8 he argued that the jury instruc-
tions would not provide him sufficient protection against the
hearsay evidence. 9 The prosecutor stated he intended that the
confession only be used against the confessor and not against
the defendant. 9 The Court held that where a co-defendant's
confession is introduced into evidence, a limiting instruction to
the jury is sufficient to ameliorate any prejudicial effect that
the confession had on the defendant's case.2'
16. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
17. See id. at 233.
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; supra note 7 and accompanying text.
19. See Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (contending that
the admission of a co-defendant's confession constituted reversible error, despite limit-
ing instructions from the trial judge).
20. See id. at 241 n.7.
21. See id. at 242 ("Unless we proceed on the basis that the jury will follow the
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The Court later reconsidered and overruled Delli Paoli in the
landmark case of Bruton v. United States.22 In Bruton, the
confession of a co-defendant was introduced into evidence dur-
ing a joint trial with the instruction that it be considered only
with regard to the confessor's case.' The Court held that the
hearsay evidence was so threatening to the non-confessing
defendant's case that a jury could not reasonably be expected to
disregard it.' The prejudicial effect upon the jury, combined
with the non-confessing defendant's inability to effectively cross-
examine the confessor, was too great to be effectively dis-
charged by a limiting instruction.'
Justice White, in his dissent, stated that the application of
the holding in Bruton would mandate severance in joint trials
where the confession of one defendant may implicate another
defendant." White lamented this result because it would cur-
tail the efficiency and consistency of joint trials."' Rather, cum-
bersome individual trials would ensue, with the resulting bur-
den upon witnesses, prosecutors, and the court." The only oth-
er option that Justice White foresaw was the non-use of co-de-
fendant confessions at trial.29 This option, he warned, may be
impracticable because in many cases, the confession of the de-
fendant is the linchpin of the prosecutor's case."0
In a creative attempt to comply with the requirements of
Bruton, prosecutors began to redact the confessions of co-defen-
dants in joint trials so as to exclude the names or, in some cas-
es, any reference to the existence of other defendants.3' In
court's instructions where those instructions are clear and the circumstances are such
that the jury can reasonably be expected to follow them, the jury system makes little
sense.").
22. 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
23. See id. at 123-24.
24. See id. at 137.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 143-44 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the only other alternative
would be not to use the confession in the trial at all).
27. See id. at 143.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. ("[Tihe defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and
damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.").
31. See Ritter, supra note 6, at 873-74.
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Richardson v. Marsh,32 the prosecutor deleted any references
to the existence of the defendant in the confession of a co-defen-
dant.33 Circumstantial evidence, however, linked the defendant
to elements of the crime as detailed in the confession.34 For
example, the prosecutor introduced testimony that the defen-
dant was in the same automobile at the same time as the con-
fessor.35 The confession stated that during this time, the con-
fessor plotted his crime."6 The defendant alleged that because
she was present in the car, this could lead a jury to assume
that she had conspired with the confessor, or at least had
knowledge of the planned crime."
The Supreme Court held that because the confession made no
reference to the existence of the defendant, it was not barred
by Bruton." The circumstantial evidence which linked the de-
fendant to the confession was not as compelling as an explicit
mention of the defendant within the body of the confession. 9
Accordingly, the Court expressed confidence that a properly
instructed jury would be able to disregard the confession with
reference to the non-confessing defendant. ° The Court declined
to rule, however, about whether the substitution of a neutral
pronoun or symbol for the defendant's name within a confession
would satisfy Bruton.4 The Court limited its ruling to the
redaction of co-defendant confessions which eliminate any refer-
ence to the defendant's existence.42
32. 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
33. See id. at 203.
34. See fd. at 204.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 203 n.1 ("I got in the car and Kareem told me he was going to
stick up this crib, told me the place was a numbers house.").
37. See id. at 206.
38. See id. at 207-08.
39. See id. at 208 (holding that [w]here the necessity of such linkage is involved,
it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to
disregard the evidence").
40. See id. at 208-09.
41. See id. at 211 n.5 ("We express no opinion on the admissibility of a confession
in which the defendant's name has been replaced with a symbol or a neutral pro-
noun.").
42. See i. at 211.
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III. GRAY V. MARYLAND
In Gray v. Maryland," the Court revisited the issue left
open by Richardson. The Court was asked to rule upon the
admissibility at a joint trial of a co-defendant's redacted con-
fession, in which the defendant's name had been replaced with
the word "deleted" or a similar symbol." The Court considered
extending the Bruton rule to situations where the non-confess-
ing defendant is not specifically named in the confession of a
co-defendant, but his existence is easily inferred.45
Petitioner Gray was convicted of the involuntary manslaugh-
ter of Stacey Williams after a joint trial in the Circuit Court of
Baltimore.48 The trial court found that Gray and six other
group members, including his co-defendant Anthony Bell, par-
ticipated in beating Williams." Bell confessed to authorities
that he, Gray, and another individual beat Williams to
death.4" At trial, the prosecutor introduced this confession as
evidence against Bell.49
The trial judge permitted this inclusion with the stipulation
that the confession be redacted to remove any mention of
Gray.5 ° The prosecutor revised the confession and had the con-
fession read aloud in open court.51 Wherever Gray's name had
previously appeared in the confession, the word "deleted"" was
43. 118 S. Ct. 1151 (1998).
44. See id. at 1153 (noting that Gray "differs from Bruton in that the prosecu-
tion ... redacted the co-defendant's confession by substituting for the defendant's
name in the confession a blank space or the word 'deleted").
45. See id. at 1157.
46. See Gray v. Maryland, 667 A.2d 983, 984 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).





52. See id. (noting also that a copy of the confession was introduced into evidence




inserted. The jury convicted both defendants of involuntary
manslaughter.
5 3
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals overturned Gray's
conviction.54 The court held that the Bruton rule prohibits the
inclusion of a co-defendant's confession, where the confession
implicates the non-confessing defendant.55 According to the
court, the jury could easily infer that the word "deleted" re-
ferred to Gray.56 Because Gray had no opportunity to cross-
examine the confessor, he was denied his Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause privileges.57 Despite the fact that the
Gray's name was removed, the confession still impermissibly
prejudiced the jury.5"
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed this holding and
reinstated Gray's manslaughter conviction.59 The court relied
upon the language of Richardson, in which the Supreme Court
stated that Bruton was a "narrow" holding.6" The court held
that a Bruton rule violation occurs only "when a co-defendant's
confession, either facially, or by compelling and inevitable infer-
ence, inculpates a non[-]confessing defendant."6 ' It was also
decided that a jury may infer that "deleted" referred to Gray
but that the inference was neither compelled nor inevitable.2
Accordingly, a jury instruction to ignore the confession with re-
gard to Gray's verdict constituted sufficient protection. 3
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
and reversed the holding of the Maryland Court of Appeals.'
53. See id. at 985.
54. See id. at 992.
55. See id. at 990 (stating that the "mere deletion of appellant's . . . name did
not effectively make Bell's statement non-incriminating as to appellant").
56. See id.
57. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; supra notes 5, 7 and accompanying text.
58. See Gray v. Maryland, 667 A.2d at 990-92 (holding that admitting the con-
fession was not a harmless error, but rather a reversible error).
59. See Maryland v. Gray, 687 A-2d 660, 661 (Md. 1997).
60. Id. at 664 (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207 (1987)).
61. Id. at 668.
62. See id. at 668-69.
63. See id. at 669. "The jury was instructed not to use Bell's confession as evi-
dence against Gray, and, in light of the strong presumption that the jury followed
those instructions, Gray's Sixth Amendment confrontation right was adequately pro-
tected." Id.
64. See Gray v. Maryland, 118 S. Ct. 1151, 1151 (1998).
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The Court held that the Bruton protective rule applied to con-
fessions in which the proper name of the defendant was re-
placed with a blank, symbol, or some other sign of modification
or deletion.65 Although not all revisions will invariably lead a
jury to identify the defendant, the Court ruled that, as a class,
such confessions are inadmissible.66 The Court refused to apply
the Richardson qualifications to the Bruton rule because,
despite the revised confession, the existence of the defendant
could still be inferred even if his exact identity was not
obvious.6"
The Court reasoned that replacing the proper name of the
defendant with a symbol or sign of deletion would call particu-
lar attention to that part of the confession." As a result, the
Court concluded that these redacted confessions, "[b]y encourag-
ing the jury to speculate about the reference .. .may overem-
phasize the importance of the confession's accusation."69
Redacted confessions similar to the one used in Gray not only
fail to protect the identity of the defendant, but rather invite
the jury to exaggerate the importance of the deletion. Thus, the
deletion is directly accusatory because the jury may reasonably
identify the defendant even without any circumstantial evidence
linking him to the contents of the confession."
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Scalia, criticized
the conclusion of the majority that the redacted confession was
directly accusatory.7 The dissent reasoned that nowhere in the
"four corners" of the confession was Gray's name ever men-
tioned.72 Thus, the jury had to infer his identity from the dele-
tions in the confession. Inferences such as these have a far less
inculpatory effect upon the defendant than having his proper
65. See id. at 1157.
66. See id. at 1156. "[W]e believe that, considered as a class, redactions that
replace a proper name with an obvious blank, the word 'delete,' a symbol, or similar-
ly notify the jury that a name has been deleted are similar enough to Bruton's
unredacted confessions as to warrant the same legal results." Id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1155-56.
69. Id. at 1155.
70. See id. (comparing the redacted confession grammatically to other Bruton rule
confessions).
71. See id. at 1159 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 1160.
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name included in the confession." The dissent advocated the
use of the exception to the Bruton rule found in Richardson
because jury inferences are not as prejudicial as facially dis-
criminatory confessions.' Accordingly, a jury instruction to
disregard the confession with respect to the defendant's case
should be sufficient.75
IV. THE CONSISTENCY OF GRAY V. MARYLAND WITH
PRIOR PRECEDENT
A. The Expectations Upon Juries
In Gray, the Supreme Court again examined the competing
interests at stake in Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
cases.76 Since Delli Paoli," the Court has endeavored to de-
termine the extent to which a jury may reasonably be expected
to follow instructions. The Court recognized that there are limi-
tations to evidence which a jury may reasonably be expected to
disregard.78 Evidence which directly inculpates a defendant is
often the most difficult to disregard pursuant to instructions
from a judge.79 Inferentially incriminating evidence is not usu-
ally as difficult to ignore.8" Courts, however, have recognized
that some inferential evidence may be so prejudicial as to
warrant its complete exclusion at trial."' Gray v. Maryland
represents the Supreme Court's latest attempt to determine the
permissibility of inferential evidence accompanied by jury
instructions.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 1159-60.
75. See id. at 1161 (suggesting that a limiting instruction to the jury in cases
where the defendant's proper name is removed satisfies both the constitutional rights
of the accused and the need for judicial and administrative efficiency).
76. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
77. 352 U.S. 232 (1957); see 'discussion supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
78. See Garcia, supra note 7, at 402.
79. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968) (establishing the
"powerfully incriminating" standard).
80. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987). "[W]ith regard to inferen-
tial incrimination the judge's instruction may well be successful in dissuading the
jury from entering onto the path of inference in the first place, so that there is no
incrimination to forget." Id.
81. See Gray v. Maryland, 118 S. Ct. 1151, 1157 (1998). "Richardson must depend
in significant part upon the kind of, not the simple fact of, inference." Id.
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1. Jury Instructions
As a general rule, juries are expected to follow the instruc-
tions of the presiding judge.82 Without such an expectation, the
jury system would make little sense.8" This extends to witness'
testimony introduced at a joint trial. The testimony of a witness
at a joint trial is not assumed to be "against" a defendant if the
jury is instructed to only consider the evidence against a co-de-
fendant.84 Thus, despite the fact that the witness may also
inculpate the defendant, the evidence will be admissible, provid-
ed there is a proper limiting jury instruction.
In some cases, the prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence
against a defendant is so great that a jury instruction cannot
cure the impact.s5 This was first recognized in Jackson v.
Denno,8 in which the Court determined that the reading of an
inadmissible coerced confession prejudiced the jury too severely
for a limiting instruction to correct."7 This decision paved the
way for the Bruton rule. The Bruton Court held that a confes-
sion of one co-defendant which inculpates the other defendant
is too prejudicial, despite any corrective jury instructions."
The Court limited the Bruton ruling, however, in Richardson
v. Marsh.9 According to the holding in Richardson, a jury may
be trusted to follow limiting instructions where the confession
of the co-defendant has been redacted to exclude any reference
to the existence of the defendant.0 If circumstantial evidence
is introduced linking the defendant with the confession, then
the jury is only inferring that the defendant's actions were tied
to those outlined in the confession. This inference does not
82. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206; see also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971) (stating that proper jury instructions may remedy the inclusion of normally
inadmissible evidence at trial).
83. See Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S.,232, 242 (1957); see also supra note
21 and accompanying text.
84. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206.
85. See Garcia, supra note 7, at 402.
86. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
87. See id. at 382-83.
88. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968); see also supra notes
22-23 and accompanying text.




prejudice the jury to such an extent that a remedial instruction
by the presiding judge would fail to cure its effect.9 '
In Gray,92 the Court considered the effect of a redacted con-
fession which deleted the proper name of a non-confessing co-
defendant.93 The Court held that a jury would almost invari-
ably link the redaction directly to the non-confessing co-defen-
dant.94 Further, the Court held that this association would un-
duly prejudice the co-defendant, despite any limiting instruc-
tions. 5 The Court assumed that a jury would be less apt to
forget evidence which was directly or obviously linked to the de-
fendant.96 Thus, where the confession of a co-defendant direct-
ly or obviously refers to a non-confessing co-defendant, the
Bruton rule will apply and limiting instructions will fail.97
Where a link to the non-confessing co-defendant is not obvious,
as in Richardson, the Court, however, will not apply the limited
ruling in Bruton, and jury instructions will be sufficient.
2. Degree of Inference v. Invitation to Speculate
The degree to which a jury may associate a redacted confes-
sion with a non-confessing co-defendant is of tantamount impor-
tance to any consideration of the reasonable expectations to
place upon juries. Prior to Gray, the federal appellate circuits
were split on the issue of how to classify inferences arising out
of the use of co-defendant confessions at joint trial. In order to
determine whether an inference impermissibly prejudiced a
non-confessing co-defendant, the circuits developed two distinct
tests: (1) the "degree of inference," and (2) the "invitation to
speculate."8
Under the "degree of inference" test, the court must deter-
mine, on a case-by-case basis, the likelihood that a jury will
91. See id. at 208. "In short, while it may not always be simple for the members
of a jury to obey the instruction that they disregard an incriminating inference, there
does not exist the overwhelming probability of their inability to do so . . . ." Id.
92. 118 S. Ct. 1151 (1998); see supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
93. See Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1155.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 1156.
96. See id. at 1157.
97. See id.
98. See Ritter, supra note 6, at 899.
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link the redacted confession to the non-confessing co-defen-
dant.9 The court's determination must be performed before the
confession is introduced and may include a consideration of all
the other evidence in the case.' Thus, the court will consider
whether circumstantial or extrinsic evidence would aid the jury
in linking the confession to the non-confessing co-defendant. In
measuring the risk of linkage, trial courts are to "consider the
degree of the inference the jury must make to connect the de-
fendant to the statement and the degree of risk that the jury
will make that linkage despite a limiting instruction."''
The "degree of inference" test is quite unwieldy. The test
requires the court to consider the impact evidence may have on
a jury before that evidence is even offered by litigants.' Fur-
ther, by determining the admissibility of confessions on a case-
by-case basis, no clear precedent may be established which
would guide future prosecutorial redactions."' Although the
"degree of inference" test offers some degree of flexibility, it is
cumbersome in application.
The "invitation to speculate" test, on the other hand, deals
exclusively with the redaction itself. The court must determine
whether the redaction impermissibly informs the jury that the
proper names of co-conspirators have been intentionally
redacted from the confession."4 The court will not consider
the effect which circumstantial evidence may have upon jury
linkage."' Rather, the court will look only to the four corners
of the confession to determine whether it would alert the jury
to the changes made by the prosecutors." 6
99. See id. The author cites to the test first formulated in Foster v. United States
which the court found was mandated by Bruton v. United States. See id. (citing Fos-
ter v. United States, 548 A.2d 1370, 1379 (D.C. 1988)); see also infra text accompany-
ing note 101.
100. See Ritter, supra note 6, at 907 (questioning whether the "degree of inference"
test is workable).
101. Foster, 548 A.2d at 1379.
102. See Ritter, supra note 6, at 907.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 874 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1989); People v.
Fletcher, 917 P.2d 187 (Cal. 1996); People v. Cruz, 521 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. 1988); People
v. Banks, 475 N.W.2d 769 (Mich. 1991).
104. See Ritter, supra note 6, at 908.
105. See id. at 908-10.
106. See United States v. Jones, 101 F.3d 1263, 1270 (8th Cir. 1996).
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The "invitation to speculate" test is easier to apply than the
"degree of inference" test. Under the "invitation to speculate"
test, the court may make per se rules regarding the use of
specific types of redacted confessions.0 ° Certain verbiage may
be categorically banned from co-defendant confessions, and
other language may be deemed admissible.' Unfortunately,
this approach does not offer the flexibility inherent within a
case-by-case analysis. By considering only the four corners of
the document, the court extends no degree of protection to de-
fendants who are circumstantially implicated in the confession
of a co-defendant.0 9 Thus, the "invitation to speculate" test,
although more efficient and workable, fails to provide a safe-
guard for circumstantially inculpated defendants.
In Gray, the Supreme Court utilized the "invitation to specu-
late" test to determine whether the redacted confession was
impermissibly prejudicial. The Court found that "[tihe inferenc-
es at issue here involve statements that, despite redaction, refer
clearly and directly to someone, often obviously the defendant,
and which involve inferences that a jury ordinarily could make
immediately, even were the confession the very first item intro-
duced at trial.""0 In essence, the holding states that revised
confessions in which the proper name of a defendant is replaced
with a deletion or symbol are, as a class, substantially prejudi-
cial."' This per se prohibition of symbols, which alert the jury
to a redaction, is consistent with the elements and methodology
of the "invitation to speculate" test because it considers only the
effect of the redaction itself.
Indirectly, the Court dealt a crippling blow to the "degree of
inference" test. In Gray, the Court conceded "that the jury must
use inference to connect the statement in [a] redacted confes-
107. See Ritter, supra note 6, at 912.
108. See id.
109. See id. (arguing that the "invitation to speculate" test offers no protection to
defendants who are linked circumstantially to the redacted confession or when the
jury is not told of a redaction).
110. Gray v. Maryland, 118 S. Ct. 1151, 1157 (1998).
111. See id. at 1155. "Redactions that simply replace a name with an obvious
blank space or a word such as 'deleted' or a symbol or other similarly obvious indica-
tions of alteration ... leave statements that, considered as a class, so closely resem-
ble Brutoen's unredacted statements that . . . the law must require the same result."
Id.
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sion with [a] defendant.""' The Court, however, held that the
confession in Gray calls for a direct inference, based on the
wording of the confession itself. By contrast, the confession in
Richardson "became incriminating 'only when linked with evi-
dence introduced later at trial.""' 3 Because the Richardson
Court admitted the confession, despite the fact that circumstan-
tial evidence linked it to the defendant, the Gray decision im-
plies that Richardson utilized the "invitation to speculate"
test." Had the Court used the "degree of inference" test, the
confession in Richardson would not have been admitted because
it became incriminating in light of the other evidence intro-
duced at trial. The Gray decision effectively asserts that the
Court is following a clear precedent of looking only to inferenc-
es that may be drawn from the confession itself."5
B. The Balancing of Efficiency and Fundamental Fairness
The Supreme Court has not based its holdings in co-defen-
dant confession cases exclusively on the prejudicial impact upon
juries. Rather, the Court has sought to balance the competing
interests of trial efficiency and fundamental fairness to defen-
dants in light of the prejudicial impact of inadmissible evi-
dence." '6 The Court has recognized the compelling state in-
terest in joint trials and has endeavored to weigh that interest
against the defendant's constitutional rights."7 Gray v. Mary-
land tips the scales back toward the protection of defendants to
the detriment of judicial efficiency.
112. Id. at 1156.
113. Id. at 1157 (quoting in part Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987)).
114. See id. (stating that the confession -facially incriminat[es]' the codefendant").
115. See id.
116. See James R. Lucas, Criminal Joinder and Severance, 57 INTER ALIA 17, 17
(1991).
117. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 210 (noting that confessions are essential in
realizing society's interest or convicting those who violate the law); Christiane Elyn
Cargill, People v. Fletcher, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 1127, 1130-31 (1997) (discussing the




1. The Administrative and Prosecutorial Efficacy of Joint Trials
Public policy adamantly favors joint trials. Both from an
administrative and prosecutorial perspective, joint trials ensure
efficiency."8 Because of the tactical, social, and economic ad-
vantages of utilizing this adjudicatory method, joint trials are
enjoying immense popularity both at federal and state lev-
els."9 Although some scholars have argued that the efficiency
justifications for joint trials are merely illusory,20 there is no
denying that the joinder of criminal proceedings has become
deeply rooted within the modern American justice system.'
Joint trials are a highly favored tactical weapon of prosecu-
tors. Rather than subscribing to the military rule of "divide and
conquer," prosecutors have realized that the rule of the court-
room is "combine and conquer." 2 At trial, multiple defen-
dants will attempt to exculpate themselves, often by prejudicing
the cases of their co-defendants." In most cases, there is no
defense team, rather, each defendant retains individual counsel.
Whereas the prosecution has the luxury of organizing a coordi-
nated attack, the defense is subject to infighting and disorgani-
zation.
Further, the verdicts in joint trials are more apt to be consis-
tent because one jury is deciding the cases of two or more de-
fendantsY In separate trials, different juries will consider
118. See United States v. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that
joint trials prevent inconsistent verdicts and conserve judicial and prosecutorial re-
sources).
119. See Lucas, supra note 116, at 17.
120. See Robert 0. Dawson, Joint Trials of Defendants in Criminal Cases: An
Analysis of Efficiencies and Prejudices, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1379 (1979) (arguing that
the efficiency of joint trials is illusory and significantly outweighed by the prejudice
done to co-defendants); see also United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1389 (9th Cir.
1993) (concluding that "where trials of [great] magnitude are involved, judicial econo-
my [would] often be better served by severance").
121. See William G. Dickett, Sixth Amendment-Limiting the Scope of Bruton, 78
J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 984, 992 (1988) (noting that "joint trials have been
utilized in almost one-third of the federal criminal trials in the past five years.").
122. See Lucas, supra note 116, at 17.
123. See Dawson, supra note 120, at 1422-38 (discussing conflicting trial strategies
and antagonistic defenses among co-defendants at a joint trial).
124. See id. at 1430.
125. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987).
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discrete evidence and thus may arrive at totally incongruous re-
suits. 126 Sharp contrasts in verdicts or sentencing, especially
when the defendants are known compatriots, are embarrassing
both to the prosecution and to the court.1 7 From a policy per-
spective, it is difficult to explain to the public why two juries
arrived at different conclusions from substantially similar facts.
Joint trials help to obviate that risk by assuring that only one
jury will hear all the relevant facts related to the multiple
defendants. 28
Joint trials are also easier on witnesses who would otherwise
be called to testify at multiple trials, depending upon the num-
ber of defendants involved.'29 Often, prosecutors have the un-
enviable task of compelling reluctant or hostile witnesses to
testify at just one trial." ° The burden of guaranteeing the at-
tendance of such witnesses at multiple trials is an almost in-
surmountable task. Foregoing the use of joint trials will impose
a duty upon the prosecution to account for the whereabouts of
required witnesses for a longer duration of time. Separate trials
may take years to complete, and, during this time, the prose-
cution must keep track of and be able to compel necessary
witnesses to testify at trial."'
Even an obliging witness would face considerable hardship
absent the utilization of joint trials. Between travel, time away
from work, and extensive preparation involved in testifying, the
use of separate trials will impose a great burden upon required
126. See id. "Joint trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding incon-
sistent verdicts and enabling more accurate assessment of relative culpability-advan-
tages which sometimes operate to the defendant's benefit." Id.
127. See United States v. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 143 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
"The unfairness of this is confirmed by the common prosecutorial experience of seeing
co-defendants who are tried separately strenuously jockeying for position with regard
to who should be the first to be tried." Id.
128. See United States v. Cardascia, 951 F.2d 474, 482-83 (2d Cir. 1991).
129. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 143 (White, J., dissenting); see also Richardson, 481
U.S. at 210 (discussing the inequity of "requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the
inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying" in separate trials).
130. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 75 (1980) (discussing a prosecutor's unsuc-
cessful attempt to secure a witness after issuing five subpoenas and conducting a voir
dire in hopes of acquiring the location of the witness).




witnesses. 8 ' This hardship is particularly compelling when
one considers that, in many cases, these witnesses are the vic-
tims of the defendants, and these victims must testify repeated-
ly to painful prior events.'33 Traditionally, the protection and
accommodation of innocent witnesses has been of tantamount
importance to the courts and offers one of the most compelling
justifications for the preservation of joint trials.'
Finally, joint trials conserve judicial and economic resources
by clearing multiple cases from the courts' dockets in utilizing
one adjudicatory hearing.3 ' From a public policy perspective,
this may be the most important reason of all. Not only do cases
move more efficiently through the criminal justice process, but
public tax dollars are saved when there is a joinder of separate
trials. A joint trial conserves the funds spent on witness and
juror reimbursement, court reporter fees, document reproduc-
tion, and a myriad of other trial related expenses.3 6 Further-
more, joint trials free prosecutors and judges, both on govern-
mental payrolls, to try other cases.' 3 ' This conserves resources
and reduces the need to enlarge staffs.
2. Attempts at Equilibrium: Efficiency and Fundamental
Fairness Prior to Gray v. Maryland
Recognizing their own stake in the continued utilization of
joint trials, prosecutors have attempted to avoid situations
which mandate severance. When prosecutors choose to use a co-
defendant confession, they must skate a thin line between man-
132. See Dawson, supra note 120, at 1384.
133. See State v. Duncan, 250 N.W.2d 189, 192-93 (Minn. 1977) (emphasizing the
trauma created by requiring certain witnesses to testify at multiple trials).
134. See Dawson, supra note 120, at 1384 & n.20 (citing Parker v. United States,
404 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1968)).
135. See id. at 1385; see also Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (em-
phasizing the efficiency and fairness of joint trials).
136. See United States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating
that judicial economy is the court's dominant concern); United States v. Bujubasic,
808 F.2d 1260, 1263 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that joint trials "reduce the expenditure
of judicial and prosecutorial time.").
137. See United States v. Coleman, 22 F.3d 126, 132 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that
'judicial economy and convenience are the chief virtues of joint trials-i.e., joinder
often avoids expensive and duplicative multiple trials"). But see Dawson, supra note
120, at 1385-87 (arguing that the judicial economy of joint trials is illusory).
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dated severance and the permissible introduction of evidence at
a joint trial. To ensure the continued use of joint trials, prose-
cutors have developed creative formats for introducing co-defen-
dant confessions."' In response to these attempts, courts have
struggled to find an effective balance between the public policy
arguments promulgated by the prosecution and the concern for
fundamental fairness to the accused." 9
First, prosecutors attempted to admit co-defendant confes-
sions by proposing that judges issue appropriate jury instruc-
tions. These instructions included a mandate that the jury
forbear the use of the confession in determining the guilt of the
non-confessing co-defendant. In Delli Paoli, the Court recog-
nized that juries would often have a difficult time disregarding
evidence pursuant to instructions from a judge. 4 ° Judge
Learned Hand, who had affirmed Delli Paoli's conviction upon
his appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, conceded
that a limiting instruction is a "'recommendation to the jury of
a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but
anybody else's.""' Nonetheless, Judge Hand, and later the
Supreme Court, affirmed the conviction, implying that some-
times public policy overrides individual liberty.
Later, the Supreme Court reversed itself in Bruton v. United
States, holding that jury instructions are insufficient to counter-
mand the prejudice done to non-confessing co-defendants. 42
The Bruton Court undermined efficiency interests by favoring a
staunch protection of constitutional privileges. The Court con-
sidered constitutional fairness more important than administra-
138. See Ritter, supra note 6, at 857-59 (discussing redaction, omission of co-defen-
dant confessions, and severance).
139. See Dickett, supra note 121, at 1008 (balancing judicial economy and funda-
mental fairness for the accused).
140. See 352 U.S. 232, 243 (1956) (stating that "[tihere may be practical limita-
tions to the circumstances under which a jury should be left to follow instructions");
see also supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
141. Id. at 247 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Nash v. United States, 54
F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)).
142. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968). "Despite the conceded-
ly clear instructions to the jury to disregard Evans' inadmissible hearsay evidence in-
culpating petitioner, in the context of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting instruc-
tions as an adequate substitute for 'Petitioner's constitutional right of cross-examina-
tion." Id. at 137.
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live concerns.' The effect of the inadmissible evidence
against Bruton was so damaging that, despite any administra-
tive practicalities, he was entitled to a reversal of his convic-
tion.'4 The resulting judicial and administrative inefficiency
was simply the cost of providing "'fundamental principles of
constitutional liberty.'"'45
Justice White, in his dissent, warned of the burdens which
the implementation of the Bruton rule would have upon Ameri-
can courts. 46 He stated that, pursuant to the Bruton rule,
prosecutors would have to try multiple defendants separately or
forego the use of confessions at trial.'47 In an attempt to ame-
liorate this harsh result, the Court in Richardson allowed cer-
tain redacted confessions to be allowed at trial without risking
a reversible error.' These confessions, which were redacted
so as to make no mention of the existence of the other co-defen-
dants, were deemed to be less prejudicial to the interests of
those co-defendants. Thus, the interest in judicial efficiency
outweighed the lesser prejudice exerted upon individual consti-
tutional privileges. The result comports with the familiar max-
im that "[a] defendant is entitled to a fair trial, but not a per-
fect one.""5 Where the nature and extent of the prejudice
does not violate fundamental notions of fairness, the Court will
consider administrative concerns.
3. Gray v. Maryland: A Tentative Step Towards Fundamental
Fairness
In Gray v. Maryland, the Supreme Court had to determine
whether to expand the efficiency protections set forth in Rich-
ardson or to retreat back to a stricter interpretation of
143. See id. at 134-35.
144. See id. at 136.
145. Id. at 135 (quoting People v. Fisher, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (N.Y. 1928)).
146. See id. at 143 (White, J., dissenting).
147. See id. "If deletion is not feasible, then the Government will have to choose
either not to use the confession at all or to try the defendants separately." Id.
148. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211.
149. See id. at 208 (discussing the implications of a confession incriminating on its
face and confessions requiring evidential linkage to become incriminating).
150. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135 (quoting Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619
(1953)).
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Bruton. 5' The Court held that the policy considerations im-
bedded within the Richardson holding were not properly appli-
cable.'52 Actually, Justice Breyer's majority opinion is most
notable for what it does not contain: any discussion of the im-
portance of judicial and administrative efficiency. Instead, the
holding summarily dismisses efficiency considerations by stat-
ing, "[nior are the policy reasons that Richardson provided in
support of its conclusion applicable here." 5'
In Gray, the majority opinion focused on the prejudice done
to a defendant when a co-defendant confession inculpating the
non-confessing defendant is introduced at trial. Because the
confession in Gray "facially incriminated" the non-confessing co-
defendant, the Court ruled that, as a class, co-defendant con-
fessions redacted to remove the name, but not the existence of
a non-confessing co-defendant, are "powerfully incriminat-
ing."'54 The determination that such confessions, as a class,
are "powerfully incriminating" entitles the non-confessing defen-
dant to Bruton rule protection.5 '
Once the Court determines that a defendant's constitutional
liberty has been invaded by "powerfully incriminating extrajudi-
cial statements of a co-defendant," it will not employ a balanc-
ing test.' Thus, matters of judicial and administrative effi-
ciency are necessarily subjugated to the Court's protection of
fundamental fairness. This explains why the Gray decision is
almost entirely devoid of any mention of efficiency interests. A
finding that a confession is powerfully incriminating to a non-
confessing co-defendant forecloses any implementation of a bal-
ancing test."'
In his dissent, Justice Scalia disagreed that a confession
which was redacted to include the words "deleted" or obvious
blank spaces was powerfully incriminating.' 5 He asserted that
151. See 118 S. Ct. 1151 (1998).
152. See id. at 1157.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1156.
155. See id. at 1157. "[W~e hold that the confession here at issue, which substitut-
ed blanks and the word 'delete' for the respondent's proper name, falls within the
class of statements to which Bruton's protections apply." Id.
156. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).
157. See Ritter, supra note 6, at 870-71.
158. See Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1159-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "The Court should
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such confessions incriminate only by inference similar to the
confession in Richardson.'59 Despite the fact that the inference
involved in Gray was easier for the jury to make than the one
involved in Richardson, the confession itself was not facially
incriminating.6 ° Thus, petitioner Gray should not be entitled
to Bruton rule protection, but rather he should be subject to
the balancing test established in Richardson.6'
Justice Scalia bemoaned the Court's extension of Bruton rule
protection to name-redacted confessions, which he argued were
not facially incriminating.'62 He warned that extending the
Bruton rule "to name-redacted confessions 'as a class' will seri-
ously compromise 'society's compelling interest in finding, con-
victing, and punishing those who violate the law.""63 Because
the confession incriminates only by inference, its prejudicial ef-
fects must be weighed against society's interest in joint trials
and the use of legally obtained confessions."6 Citing his ma-
jority opinion in Richardson, Scalia cautioned that "foregoing
[the] use of co-defendant confessions or joint trials was 'too
high' a price to insure that juries never disregard their instruc-
tions." 65
Nonetheless, the Gray Court squarely aligned itself with the
protection of the fundamental rights of the accused. Deciding
that name-redacted confessions were, "as a class," substantially
prejudicial silenced the horn of retreat which the Court had
been sounding ever since the Richardson decision.'66 Gray rep-
have stopped with its concession: the statement 'Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other
guys' does not facially incriminate anyone but the speaker." Id. at 1159.
159. See id. Justice Scalia conceded that confessions which redact the defendant's
name are more incriminating than those which omit any reference to his existence.
However, he declined to find that name redactions were "powerfully incriminating."
See id. at 1160.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 1161. "I do not understand the Court to disagree that the redaction
itself left unclear to whom the blank referred. That being so, the rule set forth in
Richardson applies, and the statement could constitutionally be admitted with [a]
limiting instruction." Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
162. See id. at 1159.
163. Id. at 1160 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (citation
omitted)).
164. See id. at 1160-61.
165. Id. at 1160 (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209-10 (1987)).
166. Id. at 1156.
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resents a return to the concept of fundamental fairness to the
accused. This return, however, to constitutional protectionism
bears with it a resulting loss of administrative and judicial
efficiency.'67
V. THE ADMINISTRATiVE AND JUDICIAL RAMIFICATIONS
OF GRAY V. MARYLAND
The ruling in Gray v. Maryland imposes a substantial burden
upon trial courts and prosecutors. In order to assuage the prej-
udicial effects upon juries, prosecutors are now faced with four
unappealing options. They may revise confessions to eliminate
any mention of the existence of the co-defendants, utilize multi-
ple juries or bifurcated trials, forego the use of co-defendant
confessions at joint trials, or try each defendant separately."
Each of these options either severely complicates the trial pro-
cess or weakens the case against the confessing defendant.
A. Redaction
In the wake of Gray, the first option open to prosecutors is to
submit redacted confessions which comply with the ruling in
Richardson.69 The prosecutor must remove not only the prop-
er name, but also any symbols or blanks which may alert the
jury that the co-defendant's name has been redacted.170 In
Gray, for example, the answer to the question of who beat
Stacey was: "[i]e, [deleted], [deleted], and a few other
guys."'7' The Court concluded that this redaction was improp-
er, but hinted in dicta that a redaction to "[m]e and a few other
guys" would have adequately protected petitioner Gray.
17
Such a redaction would be fundamentally similar to the one in
Richardson v. Marsh.
73
167. See David E. Seidelson, The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court:
Some Good News and Some Bad News, 17 HoFsTRA L. REV. 51, 69-70 (1988).
168. See Garcia, supra note 7, at 412-15.
169. See id. at 415-21 (discussing the requirements of redaction after Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987)).
170. See Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1156.
171. Id. at 1158.
172. See id. at 1157.
173. See id. "Richardson itself provides a similar example of this kind of redaction.
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Although the Court makes clear that a Richardson redaction
was possible in Gray, the problem with this approach is that
such revisions are not always possible. Written confessions are
not often conveniently phrased to allow the redaction of the
non-confessing co-defendant's name, while maintaining the fact
that the confessor participated with others in the act.74 For
example, had the confession in Gray provided only "Gray and
me beat Stacey," a redaction would read "Me beat Stacey."
Thus, redactions are not always possible because confessions
are sometimes and often written without considering the later
need for redaction. The prior example demonstrates how awk-
ward and unintelligible such redactions may be.
Certain crimes require the existence and participation of
accomplices. Justice 'Scalia warned that for inchoate charges
"redaction to delete all reference to a confederate would often
render the confession nonsensical."'75 In conspiracy trials, for
example, the removal of the existence of co-conspirators makes
the confession entirely meaningless. 6 For many cases which
rely upon written confessions, redaction is not a viable option.
Even if the confession could be properly edited to exclude any
allusion to the existence of a co-defendant, there is considerable
debate over the propriety of such a redaction. The majority
opinion, in dicta, hinted that a jury need not be informed that
a confession has been edited.'77 The dissent stated, however,
that the Court had "never before endorsed-and ought not en-
dorse-the redaction of a statement by some means other than
the deletion of certain words, with the fact of the deletion
shown." 78 It remains to be seen whether the Court will re-
quire some indication to the jury that a particular confession
The confession there at issue had been 'redacted to omit all reference to [the] respon-
dent-indeed, to omit all indication that anyone other than Martin and Williams
participated in the crime' ... ." Id. (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 203
(1987)).
174. See Ritter, supra note 6, at 914-17.
175. Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1160 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. See id.
177. See id. at 1157. The Court noted that the confession in RichardSon did not
violate the fundamental rights of the co-defendants because it had been redacted to
omit all reference to the non-confessing co-defendant and "it did not indicate that it
had been redacted." See id. (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 1160 (footnote omitted).
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has been redacted and to what extent that disclosure may prej-
udice a non-confessing co-defendant.
Oral confessions offer some degree of relief from the quanda-
ry. Oral confessions include all inculpatory statements made to
investigating officers which are neither transcribed at the time
they are spoken nor signed by the confessing party."9 In con-
fessions made to law enforcement personnel, the prosecutor will
often call the officer who has taken the confession to the wit-
ness stand.' Without an exact transcript of the confession,
the officer has more freedom to paraphrase or to answer care-
fully phrased questions which implicate only part of the confes-
sion.18" ' Thus, a skilled prosecutor can dance around Bruton
rule requirements and still preserve the efficacy of the confes-
sion against the confessing co-defendant.
A current trend in law enforcement is the utilization of video
and audio tapes to record confessions.'82 These methods raise
peculiar Bruton rule problems in the wake of the Gray decision.
At trial, not only will the jury listen to what the confessing co-
defendant says, but also how he says it. Thus, the editing of
tapes to exclude reference to a non-confessing co-defendant will
affect how the jury appraises the demeanor of the confessor. 8
This can affect the level of veracity and comprehensiveness
which the jury ascribes to the confession."
Not only do taped confessions face these peculiar problems,
but they also raise the problems which plague the redaction of
written confessions. For example, if a tape is edited, should the
jury be made aware of the redaction or should the revised con-
179. But see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (establishing that oral
confessions may be inadmissible if the confessor is not apprised of his right to remain
silent).
180. See Heath S. Berger, Let's Go to the Videotape: A Proposal to Legislate Video-
taping of Confessions, 3 ALB. L.J. SCL. & TECH. 165, 174 (1993).
181. See id. at 174-75 (commenting on the inaccuracies and discrepancies of oral
confessions which are later transcribed).
182. See Gregory P. Joseph, Video Tape Evidence in the Courts-1985, 26 S. TEX.
L.J. 453, 466 (1985).
183. See Benjamin V. Madison, III, Note, Seeing Can Be Deceiving: Photogrdphic
Evidence in a Visual Age-How Much Weight Does it Deserve?, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 705, 733 (1984) (proposing that videotapes do not always accurately depict the
demeanor of a witness).




fession be presented to the jury as complete and uncensored?
All editing of tapes must be disclosed to the court, but whether
that information is passed along to the jury is a matter of judi-
cial discretion.'85  In his dissent, Justice Scalia cautions
against the introduction of a revised confession without alerting
the jury that it has been edited.'86 Thus, in the wake of Gray,
it remains ambiguous whether the introduction of a redacted
taped confession would require some general indication to the
jury that the confession has been edited.
Where possible, the use of a redacted confession is the most
effective option for prosecutors, but the Gray ruling limits its
future utility. By requiring prosecutors to remove anything
inferentially incriminating to a non-confessing co-defendant
from a confession, the Court placed far-reaching restrictions on
written and recorded confessions.8 7 The unrecorded oral con-
fession may be the best option available to law enforcement
personnel, who may then paraphrase the words of the defen-
dant in open court so as to exclude any inferences to a co-de-
fendant."s In this sense, the Court rewards the use of unre-
corded investigative techniques, which are inherently the least
reliable sources of evidence and which ordinarily would be af-
forded the least amount of evidentiary weight.
B. Multiple Juries and Bifurcated Trials
The second option is the use of multiple juries or a bifurcated
trial.'89 Under a multiple jury approach, separate juries would
hear only the evidence which is relevant to the defendant
whose culpability they will assess.' During the introduction
of a co-defendant confession, the jury deciding the fate of the
other defendant may be removed from the courtroom or prohib-
ited from viewing a written or otherwise recorded confes-
185. See Joseph, supra note 182, at 468 (stating that the editing of any videotaped
evidence must be disclosed to the court).
186. See Gray v. Maryland, 118 S. Ct. 1151, 1160 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 1156.
188. See Berger, supra note 180, at 174-75.
189. See Garcia, supra note 7, at 414-15.
190. See Note, Richardson v. Marsh: Co-defendant Confessions and the Demise of
Conformation, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1889 (1988).
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sion.19' In a bifurcated trial, the evidence against the non-
confessing defendants is introduced first.9 2 Then, the jury de-
cides guilt or innocence based upon that evidence.'93 Only af-
ter the jury has delivered its verdict will the prosecutor enter
the confession into evidence, to be used solely against the
confessor.'94
To date, very few jurisdictions have experimented with the
use of multiple juries at joint trials. Where the approach has
been used, it has met with approval upon appeal.9 Although
the United States Supreme Court has yet to make an affirma-
tive ruling on the constitutionality of utilizing multiple juries,
numerous federal circuits and state appellate courts have af-
firmed convictions resulting from this method.' The review-
ing courts generally have required a showing that the accused
was specifically prejudiced at trial due to the use of multiple ju-
ries."'97 Consequently, very few convictions arising out of the
use of multiple juries have been overturned.'
The use of bifurcated trials in co-defendant cases has been
narrowly upheld by the Sixth Circuit. In United States v.
Crane, the court held that a confessing co-defendant was not
prejudiced by the use of a bifurcated trial.199 In that case, all
the evidence except for Crane's confession was introduced, and
the jury deliberated on the guilt or innocence of Crane's co-de-
191. See id.
192. See Annotation, Propriety of Use of Multiple Juries at Joint Trial of Multiple
Defendants in Federal Criminal Case, 72 A.L.R. FED. 875, 876 (1985) (defining bifur-
cated trials).
193. See Garcia, supra note 7, at 415.
194. See id.
195. See Note, supra note 190, at 1892. "Although there is no explicit statutory
authorization for the multiple jury technique, no federal or state appellate court has
found a trial court's use of this technique to be unconstitutional." Id.
196. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States
v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1982); People v. Wardlow, 118 Cal. App. 3d, 375
(1981); People v. Brooks, 285 N.W.2d 307 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
197. See Annotation, supra note 192, at 878; David Carl Minneman, Annotation,
Propriety of Use of Multiple Juries at Joint Trial of Multiple Defendants in State
Criminal Prosecution, 41 A.L.R. 4th 1189, 1190 (1986).
198. But see United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1972) (overturning
a conviction where the improper jury heard inculpatory remarks from a government
witness).
199. 499 F.2d 1385 (6th Cir. 1974).
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fendant, Brown."° After the jury found Brown not guilty, the
prosecution introduced Crane's confession and asked that the
jury deliberate upon all the evidence introduced at trial.0 1
The jury did so and found Crane guilty.0 2 The Sixth Circuit
stated that since Brown was found not guilty, the jury's initial
decision could not prejudice the subsequent verdict against
Crane.0 3 Had the jury convicted Brown, the court hinted that
it would have unduly prejudiced their subsequent verdict with
regard to Crane.2°4 Following United States v. Crane, there is
a valid concern that federal circuits will refuse to allow the
bifurcation of joint trials.
The practical difficulties with both approaches are the same.
Both are unwieldy and unpredictable. 5 It is difficult for pros-
ecutors to refrain from inadvertently referencing evidence which
one jury was not meant to hear or was not ready to hear.0
Also, witnesses may be entirely unpredictable and allude to a
confession without knowing the rules under which the court is
operating.0 7 Mistakes such as these may lead to reversible
errors under Gray's interpretation of the Bruton rule.0 Fur-
ther complicating matters is the physical layout of most Ameri-
can courtrooms. The majority of courts have only one jury box
and one jury deliberation room. Given the importance of segre-
gating juries and preventing interaction, judicial floor-plans of-
ten stifle the use of these approaches at trial. 9 As a result of
both the practical and physical difficulties presented by these
200. See id. at 1387.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 1388. "Brown, whose case was tried first, was found not guilty.
Consequently we do not believe that the jury drew an adverse inference from Brown's
association with defendant as developed at trial." Id.
204. See id. "If a jury were to find one of the defendants guilty, there could be a
serious question whether the same jury could later give his co-defendant the dispas-
sionate and unprejudiced hearing required by due process and by the [S]ixth
[A]mendment." Id.
205. See Garcia, supra note 7, at 414-15.
206. See id.
207. See, e.g., United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1972).
208. See Garcia, supra note 7, at 414-15.
209. See Patrick Ingram, Note, Censorship By Multiple Prosecution: "annihilation,
by attrition if not conviction", 77 IOWA L. REV. 269, 305 (1991).
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approaches, prosecutors and judges are very reluctant to utilize
either a multiple jury technique or a bifurcated trial.10
C. Foregoing the Use of Co-defendant Confessions at Trial
The third option available to prosecutors is to forego the use
of the co-defendant's confession at trial.21' This approach may
be used when other direct and circumstantial evidence incontro-
vertibly links the confessing co-defendant to the crime. 2 By
foregoing the use of the confession, the co-defendants may be
tried jointly in an efficient proceeding. Obviously, this is an
effective approach only in cases where there is no need to rely
upon the confession of the defendant.
The drawback of foregoing the use of a confession is readily
apparent. Often, the confession is the single most compelling
piece of evidence against a defendant.21 To forego its use sub-
stantially weakens the case against the defendant, oftentimes
making conviction impossible. 4 Thus, this option is only via-
ble when a joint trial is adamantly desired and there is little
prejudice done to the prosecution's case. Although this option
will invariably protect against mistrials based upon the Bruton
rule, the detriments of this option almost always outweigh its
utility.
D. Severance
The final option left open by Gray is severance." 5 Sever-
ance simply means that the prosecutor foregoes utilizing a joint
trial approach and tries each defendant separately.' In some
210. See Garcia, supra note 7, at 414-15.
211. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 143-44 (1968) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that where redaction is not possible, prosecutors must choose between
severance and non-use of the confession).
212. See Garcia, supra note 7, at 413-14.
213. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 139-40 (White, J., dissenting) (asserting that a
defendant's confession is "probably the most probative and damaging evidence that
can be admitted against him").
214. See Ritter, supra note 6, at 858 (asserting that foregoing the use of a
defendant's confession is rarely a viable option).
215. See Garcia, supra note 7, at 412-13.
216. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 14.
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cases, where one co-defendant may be prejudiced by evidence
submitted against another co-defendant, a judge may mandate
severance."' The Sixth Circuit has justified judicially imposed
severance by stating, "[jiustice, not judicial economy, is the first
principle of our legal system. And under no circumstances may
well-intentioned efforts to conserve judicial time be permitted to
prejudice the fundamental right of a criminal defendant to a
fair trial."218
Given the aforementioned advantages of joint trials, sever-
ance is utilized with great reluctance by prosecutors.219 Sepa-
rate trials often prove cumbersome for prosecutors, witnesses,
and judges.2 20 They are most often utilized where a confession
is essential to the prosecution of one defendant but cannot be
redacted to ameliorate the inculpatory effect on other defen-
dants. 22' Though administratively inefficient, it is a useful ve-
hicle for securing the constitutional rights of the accused.
Because the Gray decision imposes additional burdens upon
the redaction of co-defendant confessions, there will be a corre-
sponding increase in the amount of voluntary and judicially
imposed severance. Although Gray certainly does not sound a
death knell for the use of redaction, it will have a chilling effect
upon the number of cases where redaction is a viable option. In
many of those cases, severance, either voluntary or judicially
imposed, will represent the only method available to the prose-
cutor.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Gray v. Maryland,222 the Supreme Court further defined
the requirements of the Bruton rule. The decision represents a
hesitant step away from the strict interpretation of the rule
that the Court expressed in Richardson v. Marsh.2  Once
again, the Court recognized that because some evidence is so
217. See id.
218. United States v. Crane, 499 F.2d 1385, 1388 (6th Cir. 1974).
219. See discussion supra footnotes 129-137 and accompanying text.
220. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987).
221. See Garcia, supra note 7, at 413.
222. 118 S. Ct. 1151 (1998).
223. 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
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prejudicial to a co-defendant at a joint trial, remedial jury in-
structions are insufficient to protect the constitutional rights of
the accused.2" In Gray, however, this theory was applied to
confessions which incriminate the non-confessing co-defendant
only inferentially.25 By recognizing that inferentially incrimi-
nating statements may be unduly prejudicial, the Court has
placed the fundamental rights of the accused above public poli-
cy efficiency considerations.
Still, the Gray decision is limited in scope. The Court de-
clined to extend Bruton rule protection to statements which are
incriminating only in light of other evidence in the case. Rath-
er, the statement itself has to be inferentially incriminating,
irrespective of circumstantial and extrinsic evidence." 6 By
adopting this "four corners" approach, the Court deprives the
accused of protection from confessions which easily may be
linked to him circumstantially. Although not stated within the
Gray decision, the public policy efficiency concerns expressed in
Richardson still influence the Court to the detriment of the
accused.
Ultimately, the effects of Gray will be far-reaching, given the
popularity of joint trials within both state and federal court sys-
tems.227 In the wake of Gray v. Maryland, there will be an
increase both in the number of redacted confessions presented
to courts and in the amount of judicially-imposed severance. To
avoid the repercussions of Gray, both trial courts and prosecu-
tors will be far more amenable to the use of innovative trial
formats, such as multiple juries and bifurcated trials. Gray v.
Maryland tips the scales of justice away from judicial economy
and towards the protection of the accused.
Richard F. Dzubin
224. See Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1155.
225. See id. at 1157.
226. See id.
227. See discussion supra footnotes 116-37 and accompanying text.
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